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Introduction

The notion of ring signature was put forth by Rivest et al. [16] in 2001. In such a scheme, anyone can sign
a message on behalf of an ad-hoc created group (i.e. the ring) anonymously. In 2007, Chandran et al. [8]
presented a novel approach to achieve a sub-linear size ring signature scheme without random oracles, with
perfect anonymity in the common reference string model. Their scheme is proven secure under the Strong
√
√
Diffie-Hellman and the Subgroup Decision assumptions, by setting the ring as a N × N matrix for N
members. In this work, we aim to further reduce the size of a ring signature, which is a very challenging
task.

Our Contributions
In this paper, we provide the first ring signature with logarithmic size without random oracles. To achieve
our result, we extend the idea proposed by Chandran et al. [8]. We construct our scheme following their
techniques using composite order groups with a bilinear map. We prove it secure under the Strong Diffie-
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Hellman and the Subgroup Decision assumptions. We obtain perfect anonymity in the common reference
string model.
The crux of our scheme is that we achieve O(log2 (N )) for the ring signatures size, where N is the number
of members in the ring. In the following table, we compare our scheme with the one from Chandran et al.
[8] to highlight the difference in performance.

Size of the common Size of the Number of elements
Typical Values for k = 128
reference string ring signature
in
the
signature
N
=
1, 000 N = 10, 000 N = 100, 000
√
√
Chandran et al.’s [8]
O(k)
O(k N )
6 + 6dk N e
24292
76806
242869
Our approach
O(k)
O(k log2 (N )) 6 + 7dk log2 (N )e
8935
11912
14888
Scheme

Table 1. Comparison of the size of the ring signature and the number of elements in the signature between Chandran
et al.’s work [8] and ours, including the size of the common reference string. Let N be the number of members and k
be the security parameter.

Our Technique
The novelty of our scheme is to construct the ring as a log2 (N )-dimensional hypercube for N members,
which yields a logarithmic size ring signature scheme. A d-dimensional hypercube has N = 2d vertices and
d2d−1 edges. Each vertex corresponds to a d-bit binary string and two vertices are linked with an edge if
and only if their binary strings differ in precisely one bit. Therefore, each vertex is adjacent to d = log2 (N )
other vertices, one for each bit position. We illustrate the hypercubes with N equal to 2, 4 and 8 in Fig. 1.

In [8], a grid is picked such that the diameter is of the square root of the number of the points on the
√
graph, i.e. N . In our paper, we consider the hypercube as a graph which has the smallest diameter for a
given number of points. Thus, the diameter is of the logarithm of number of the points on the graph, i.e.
log2 (N ).
In our approach, we use a log2 (N )-dimensional hypercube as a N -member ring to construct the signature.
Each verification key v in the ring is indexed by a d-bit string, denoted as b1 b2 · · · bd . In order to retrieve v,
we need to follow the path formed by all the bits, from b1 to bd . We obtain v as the vertex corresponding to
b1 · · · bd . Moreover, the signature related to the verification key v has an equal size to the length of the path
between two vertices of the hypercube, i.e. between two points of the graph. We illustrate the graph with N
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Fig. 1. The N -vertex hypercube for N = 2, 4, 8. Two vertices are linked with an edge if and only their string differ in
precisely one bit position. Diameters are shown in dashed line.
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Fig. 2. N = 16. The diameter is shown in dashed line and the squares represent the points through which the diameter
passes.
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In Fig. 3, we compare the paths in the grid and the hypercube. The paths start from point (resp. vertex)
0010 and finish at point (resp. vertex) 1100. We notice that in the grid, the path is 5-edge long, whereas
in the hypercube, it is only 3-edge long. This is due to that in a hypercube, we reach intermediate vertices
that differ from their direct neighbors in only one bit. Since 0010 and 1100 differ in three bits (only the last
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bit remains unchanged), we must pass through 1010 and 1110 to reach 1100. In the grid, we pass through
“useless” points 0110 and 1101, increasing the number of edges in the path’s length. The diameter of a
hypercube is always shorter than the one of the grid and the same property holds for the paths between
√
√
two given vertices (resp. points). While Chandran et al. [8] constructed their scheme based on a N × N matrix, which is treated as a grid, our construction relies on structure of a hypercube. Hence, in our scheme,
the verification keys will be the vertices of a hypercube of dimension log2 (N ) and the size of the signature
will depend of the path built to reach a targeted verification key.

Fig. 3. N = 16. In the grid (resp. hypercube), the path is drawn from point (resp. vertex) 0010 to point (resp. vertex)
1100. The grid’s path is 2-edge longer than the hypercube’s one.
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Related Work
Ring signatures have been found very promising in many practical applications [15, 9]. Rivest et al. [16]
proved their unconditional anonymous scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Zhang and Kim [20]
incorporated the notion of identity-based cryptography to avoid the necessity of incorporating certificates.
Subsequently, Au et al. constructed a certificate-based ring signature scheme in [1]. Traceable ring signature
was proposed by Fujisaki and Suzuki [10]. Liu et al. [14] presented the first linkable ring signature scheme satisfying anonymity, linkability, and spontaneity. Wang and Liu [19] introduced the notion of signer-admission
ring signature, which is a combination of designated confirmer signatures and designated verifier proofs. In
most practical applications, the description of the ring is linear to the number of members but Dodis et al.
[9] proposed a scheme that is independent of the size of the ring in the random oracle model. Chow et al.
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[7] constructed a scheme proved secure against adaptive chosen message attack without random oracles. In
the same way, Bender et al. [4] suggested a scheme using generic ZAPs for NP in the standard model, but
it seems impractical. In addition, Shacham and Waters [18] gave a linear size ring signature, whose security relies on the computational setting of the new definitions of [4], without random oracles. Namely, they
proposed a scheme anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider corruption
attacks. Finally, Boyen [5] proposed a construction of linear size in the common random string model with
everlasting perfect anonymity. Schäge and Schwenk [17] constructed another ring signature scheme in the
standard model using basic assumptions.

2
2.1

Preliminaries and Definitions
Negligible Function

Let negl(k) be a function in the security parameter k. We say that negl(k) is a negligible function if for all
polynomials p(k), for all sufficiently large k, negl(k) < 1/p(k).

2.2

Bilinear Composite Order Groups

Let BMGen be a randomized algorithm that outputs (p, q, G, GT , e, g) as follows:
– G and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of order n = pq,
– g is a generator of G,
– e : G × G → GT is an efficiently computable map such that:
• Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∈ G, ∀a, b ∈ Zn , e(ua , v b ) = e(u, v)ab ,
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) is a generator of GT whenever g is a generator of G,
– the group operations on G and GT can be performed efficiently.
Let Gp and Gq be the unique subgroups of G of orders p and q respectively. We recall that u 7→ uq maps u
into Gp .

2.3

Boneh-Boyen Signature Scheme

Our approach is inspired by [8], where the main ingredient of the construction is Boneh-Boyen signature
scheme [2], proved existentially unforgeable under weak chosen message attack based on the Strong DiffieHellman assumption.
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As in [8], one can translate the Boneh-Boyen’s scheme into one in the composite group order model
such that forging a signature in Gp under weak chosen message attack is infeasible, based on the Strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption in Gp . The Boneh-Boyen signature scheme consists of three algorithms:
– KeyGen: given a tuple (p, q, G, GT , e, g), pick at random sk ∈R Z∗n and compute v = g sk . The key pair
is (v, sk).
1

– Sign: given a secret key sk ∈ Z∗n and a message M ∈ {0, 1}l , output the signature δ = g sk+M . By
convention, 1/0 is defined to be 0, thus sk + M = 0 ⇒ δ = 1. We have l < |p|.
– Verify: given a public key v, a message M ∈ {0, 1}l and a signature δ ∈ G, verify that e(δ, vg M ) = e(g, g).
If equality holds, output “Accept”; otherwise “Reject”.

2.4

Commitment and Encryption Schemes

The commitment/encryption scheme based on the Subgroup Decision assumption proposed in [3] is employed
in our construction. The assumption is defined in the next section.
We construct a scheme where a public key v and an element h are description of the composite order
group G. This element h is random and of order either n for perfect hiding commitment or q for encryption.
It implies that perfect hiding commitment keys look exactly the same as encryption keys.

2.5

Ring Signature Scheme

We define a ring signature scheme following [4, 8].
Definition 1 (Ring Signature). A ring signature comprises four PPT algorithms as follows:
– Gen(1k ): on input the security parameter k, outputs a common reference string λ.
– KeyGen(λ) is run by the user: on input a common reference string λ, outputs a public verification key
v and a private signing key sk.
– Sign(λ, sk, M, S): on input a message M and the ring S = {v1 , · · · , vN }, outputs a signature δ along with
(M, S). We require that (v, sk) is a valid key pair output by KeyGen and that v ∈ S.
– Verify(λ, S, M, δ): on input a purported signature δ on a message M with respect to the ring of public
keys S, outputs “Accept” if the signature is correctly verified, otherwise “Reject”.

7

Perfect Correctness: A ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) has perfect correctness if for all
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, the probability of:

λ ← Gen(1k ); (v, sk) ← KeyGen(λ); (M, S, δ) ← Sign(λ, sk, M, S) : Verify(λ, S, M, δ) = 1 ∨ v ∈
/S

is equal to 1.

3
3.1

Security
Security Properties
Intuitively, we require that a ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) has perfect anonymity if a

signature on message M under ring S and key vi0 is indistinguishable from a signature on message M under
ring S and key vi1 . The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 2 (Perfect Anonymity). Given a ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify), a polynomial
N ( ), and a PPT adversary A, we consider the following game:
1. A chooses the ring of verification keys S = {v1 , · · · , vN (k) }, such that λ ← Gen(1k ) and (vi , ski ) ←
KeyGen(λ), where i ∈ {1, · · · , N (k)}.
2. A is given access (throughout the entire game) to an oracle OSign, such that OSign(α, M, S) returns
Sign(λ, skα , M, S), where vα ∈ S.
3. A outputs a message M , distinct indices i0 , i1 , and a ring S for which vi0 , vi1 ∈ S (i.e. (vi0 , ski0 ) and
(vi1 , ski1 ) have been generated by the oracle KeyGen(λ)). A random bit b is chosen, and A is given the
signature δ ← Sign(λ, skib , M, S).
4. The adversary outputs a bit b0 , and succeeds if b0 = b.
A ring signature scheme achieves perfect anonymity, if for any PPT adversary A and any polynomial N ( ),
the success probability of A in the above game is equal to 1/2.
We also require that a ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is unforgeable (regarding insider
corruption) if it is not feasible to forge a ring signature on a message without controlling one of the members
in the ring.
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Definition 3 (Computational Unforgeability). A ring signature (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is computationally unforgeable if for any PPT adversary A and any polynomial N ( ), the probability that A succeeds
in the following game is negligible:

1. A is given the ring of verification keys S = {v1 , · · · , vN (k) }, such that λ ← Gen(1k ) and (vi , ski ) ←
KeyGen(λ), where i ∈ {1, · · · , N (k)}.
2. A is given access to a generator oracle VKGen, where VKGen(α, wα ) runs (vα , skα ) ← KeyGen(λ, wα ),
such that wα is randomly selected by the oracle, and outputs vα .
3. A is given access to a signing oracle OSign, where OSign(α, M, S) outputs Sign(λ, skα , M, S), such
that (vα , skα ) has been generated by VKGen.
4. A is given access to a corrupt oracle Corrupt, where Corrupt(α) outputs skα .
5. A outputs (S ∗ , M ∗ , δ ∗ ), and succeeds if Verify(λ, S ∗ , M ∗ , δ ∗ ) = 1. We require that A never queried
( , M ∗ , S ∗ ), and S ∗ only contains verification keys vα generated by VKGen, where α has not been
corrupted.

3.2

Assumptions

Definition 4 (Subgroup Decision Assumption). Given the generator BMGen, we define the following
distribution:
(p, q, G, GT , e, g) ← BMGen(1k ), D = (n = pq, G, GT , e, g).
The Subgroup Decision assumption holds if there is a negligible function ε (in the security parameter k) so
for any non-uniform polynomial time adversary A, we have:

P r[r ← Z∗n ; h = g r : A(D, h) = 1] − P r[r ← Z∗q ; h = g pr : A(D, h) = 1] ≤ ε(k).

Definition 5 (Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Given the generator BMGen, we define the following distribution:
(p, q, G, GT , e, g) ← BMGen(1k ), D = (p, q, G, GT , e, g).
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The Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in Gp if there is a negligible function ε (in the security parameter
k) so for any non-uniform polynomial time adversary A, we have:
2

q

P r[x ← Z∗p : A(D, g q , g qx , g qx , · · · ) = (c, g x+c ) ∈ Zp × Gp ] < ε(k).

3.3

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof

To prove that a statement is true, we can use a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof which is
complete and sound, such that no interaction is needed between the prover and the verifier.
Using results in [11] providing short common reference string and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK)
proofs for any NP language, Boyen and Waters [6] gave a NIZK proof for the statement γ = (g 2M −1 hr )r
?

verified by e(c, g −1 ) = e(h, γ). For h of order n, the proof has perfect zero-knowledge as γ is determined from
the verification equation and thus, no information is leaked from the proof. For h of order q, the verification
enables us to show that e(c, g −1 ) has order q, that implies M = 0 mod p or M = 1 mod p.
In [12], general methods are presented for constructing simple and efficient NIZK proofs over bilinear
groups.

4

Logarithmic-size Ring Signature Scheme

Let ring S = {v1 , · · · , vN } be fixed and public. A signer knows ska corresponding to one of the verification
keys in the ring S and wants to sign message M . The verification keys are issued as the ones in Boneh-Boyen
signature scheme. The signer creates a signature as follows:
1. The signer selects one-time signature keys (vkOT , skOT ) ← OTGen(1k ). The message M is signed following the one-time signature scheme. The verification key vkOT and the one-time signature are published.
The signer certifies vkOT by signing it with Boneh-Boyen signature under va .
2. The signer needs to hide va and the certifying signature on vkOT . Therefore, he/she makes two perfectly
hiding commitments to va and the signature respectively. Then, the signer makes a NIZK proof that the
commitments contain the aforementioned elements.
3. The signer proves that the committed verification key is an element of ring S. The innovation in the
scheme is the logarithmic size proof. The signer arranges S in a d-dimensional hypercube, where N = 2d
(we carefully explain the process below). For i ∈ {1, · · · , d}, he/she commits from the first bit b1 to the
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last bit bd of the string a of the hypercube that contains va and makes a NIZK proof that the committed
verification key appears in this vertex vb1 ···bd .
4.1

Construction

Gen generates a common reference string that contains the description of a composite order group and a
public key for the perfectly hiding commitment scheme.

Gen(1k ): Let the perfectly hiding commitment scheme be as follows. Run (p, q, G, GT , e, g) ← BMGen(1k ).
Set n = pq, pick at random x ∈R Z∗n and compute h = g x . Output (n, G, GT , e, g, h).

The users’ key generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input a common reference string and outputs a
signing public-private key pair (v, sk). In this case, it will output keys for the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme
that is secure against weak message attack.

KeyGen(n, G, GT , e, g, h): Let the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme with public key (g, v) be as follows. Pick
at random sk ∈R Z∗n , and compute v = g sk . Output (v, sk).

A user with keys (va , ska ) wants to sign message M under the ring S = {v1 , · · · , vN } of size N . Then,
f

a is mapped to a d-bit binary string as follows: a 7→ b1 b2 · · · bd such that f : S → {b1 b2 · · · bd ; bi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈
{1, · · · , d}} is public and bijective. It is useful to think S as a d-dimensional hypercube: we assume the existence of a public map from S onto a d-dimensional hypercube that identifies each vka with exactly one
f

vertex of the hypercube, labelled with a d-bit binary string. For instance, for a 7→ b1 b2 · · · bd , va corresponds
to the vertex defined as b1 b2 · · · bd . The verification key v is seen as a point in a d-dimensional space, where
d = log2 (N ). A ring S contains N elements v indexed by log2 (N ) bits.

Informally, we construct the commitments using the followong idea. From the vertex vb1 b2 ···bd , there are
d edges that reach d different vertices. These vertices differ from the vertex vb1 b2 ···bd in exactly one bit.
For instance, from v000···000 , we can reach v000···001 , v000···010 , · · · , v010···000 and v100···000 . In particular,
from vb1 b2 ···bi ···bd , we can reach the vertex vb1 b2 ···b̄i ···bd such that b̄i = |bi − 1| ∈ {0, 1}. Let ∗ denote the sequence of bits from the j-th position until the d-th position such that 1 ≤ j ≤ d and for j ≤ i ≤ d, the bit is
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equal to either bi or b̄i (we only consider strings of bit-length d). Thus, we can retrieve the verification key
va = vb1 b2 ···bd following the path formed by the vertices vb1 ∗ , vb1 b2 ∗ , · · · , vb1 b2 ···bd−1 ∗ and vb1 b2 ···bd−1 bd . More
f

precisely, from the verification key va such that a 7→ b1 b2 · · · bd , we can reach either vb̄1 b2 ···bd , vb1 b̄2 ···bd , · · · , or
vb1 b2 ···b̄d . Therefore, when we want to reach va , we first access the first bit b1 of a, i.e. vb1 ∗ . If we find vb̄1 ∗ ,
then we know that one of the direct neighbors is vb1 ∗ that we decide to reach. We then access the second bit
b2 of a, i.e. vb1 b2 ∗ . We have already found vb1 ∗ , thus we may meet either vb1 b2 ∗ or vb1 b̄2 ∗ . If we find vb1 b2 ∗ ,
we remain there. If we find vb1 b̄2 ∗ , then we know that one of the direct neighbors is vb1 b2 ∗ that we decide to
reach. We apply the same methodology for the other bits b3 , · · · , bd . Moroever, if we see the hypercube as a
graph whose diameter is the smallest for a given number of points, then the resulting signature is of length
of the path between two points of the graph. We illustrate the methodology to reach v for hypercubes with
N equal to 4 and 8 in Fig. 4.

Fig. 4. The N -vertex hypercube for N = 4, 8. The paths are shown in dashed lines to reach v11 and v011 . We arbitrary
start from v00 and v000 respectively, but we can start anywhere.
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Sign((n, G, GT , e, g, h, ska ), M, S):
– First, establish a one-time signature on the message and the ring, such that the pair (vkOT , δOT ) is
public. Run (vkOT , skOT ) ← OTGen(1k ), and δOT ← Sign(skOT , M, S). The pair (vkOT , δOT ) is made
public.
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– Pick at random r ∈R Zn and compute A = va hr , δa = g ska +vkOT . Randomly choose s ∈R Zn and B =
r

δa hs , γB = g ska +vkOT

+(ska +vkOT )s rs
h .

δa is the signer’s certifying signature on vkOT , and A and B are perfectly hiding commitments to va , δa ,
respectively. γB is a NIZK proof that A and B contain respectively a verification key and a signature on
vkOT , using results from [11].
The rest of the protocol is a NIZK proof that A contains va ∈ S without revealing which one, using
results from [6, 11].
– For a = b1 b2 · · · bd , start the NIZK proof from the first bit b1 of a, then the second bit b2 , and so on until
the last bit bd . Let vbi = vb1 ···bi−1 bi ∗ and vb̄i = vb1 ···bi−1 b̄i ∗ , where ∗ denotes the sequence of bits from
the i + 1-th position until the d-th position such that, for i + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the bit is equal to either bj or
rb̄

b̄j . Randomly choose rbi ∈R Zn , and set Cbi = ghrbi and γbCi = (ghrbi )rbi . Set rb̄i = −rbi , Cb̄i = h
rb̄

γb̄C = (g −1 h
i

i

rb̄

)

i

i

and

.

More precisely, for i ∈ {1, · · · , d}, the commitments Cbi , Cb̄i are chosen so that Cbi is a commitment to g
whereas Cb̄i is a commitment to 1, i.e. Cbi Cb̄i = g. The proofs γbi , γb̄i are NIZK proofs such that each
Cbi , Cb̄i contains either g or 1. Cbi Cb̄i = g tells the verifier that there is exactly one Cbi that contains g,
Q
while the other commitment contains 1. Compute Ebi = e(Cbi , vbi )e(Cb̄i , vb̄i ) = e(g, vbi ) j∈{bi ,b̄i } e(hrj , vj ),
which is a commitment to e(g, vbi ).
sb̄

– Pick at random sbi , sb̄i ∈R Zn , and compute Dbi = vbi hsbi , Db̄i = vb̄i h

i

rb

rb̄ 1
i

and γbDi = g −sbi vbi i vb̄

.

i

Specifically, the Dbi are commitments to verification keys vbi ∈ S such that the i-th bit of a is bi , for
i = 1, · · · , d. In particular, Dbd is the commitment to verification key va = vbd . The Ebi contain the bit
bi of S paired with g. γbD1 , · · · , γbDd are NIZK proofs that Db1 , · · · , Dbd contain elements that paired with
g give the contents of Eb1 , · · · , Ebd . This demonstrates to the verifier that Dbi contain the bit bi in the
indices of the verification keys in S.
Q
r
– Compute γA = g sbd −r j∈{bd ,b̄d } vj j hsj rj for bd as the last bit of a.
Here, E = e(Dbd , Cbd )e(Db̄d , Cb̄d ) is a commitment to e(g, vbd ). We recall that vbd = va . γA is a NIZK
proof that the content of A paired with g corresponds to the content in E.
– Output the signature δ = (vkOT , δOT , A, B, γB , {Cbi , Cb̄i : i ∈ {1, · · · , d}}, {γbCi , γb̄C : i ∈ {1, · · · , d}}, {Dbi , Db̄i :
i

i ∈ {1, · · · , d}}, {γbDi : i ∈ {1, · · · , d}}, γA ).
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Verify((n, G, GT , e, g, h, S), M, δ):

1. Verify that δOT is a one-time signature of M, S under vOT .
?

2. Verify e(B, Ag vkOT ) = e(g, g)e(h, γB ).
?

?

?

3. Verify e(Cbi , Cbi g −1 ) = e(h, γbCi ) and e(Cb̄i , Cb̄i g −1 ) = e(h, γb̄C ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d and Cbi Cb̄i = g.
i

?

4. Compute Ebi = e(Cbi , vbi )e(Cb̄i , vb̄i ). and verify Ebi = e(g, Dbi )e(h, γbDi ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
?

5. Compute E = e(Dbd , Cbd )e(Db̄d , Cb̄d ) and verify E = e(A, g)e(h, γA ).
6. If all the above steps verify correctly, then output “Accept”; otherwise, output “Reject”.

4.2

Security Proofs

Theorem 1. The quadruple (Gen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is a ring signature scheme with perfect correctness, perfect anonymity and computational unforgeability under the Subgroup Decision assumption, the Strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption and given that the one-time signature is unforgeable.

Proof. Perfect correctness For λ ← Gen(1k ), for (v, sk) ← KeyGen(λ), for any message M with respect
to a ring S, we prove the perfect correctness by showing that the equalities in the algorithm Verify hold.
?

– Point 2. Verify the following equality e(B, Ag vkOT ) = e(g, g)e(h, γB ).
1

e(B, Ag vkOT ) = e(δa hs , va hr g vkOT ) = e(g ska +vkOT hs , g ska hr g vkOT )
1

1

= e(g ska +vkOT h, g ska +vkOT h)rs = e(g ska +vkOT , g ska +vkOT )rs e(h, h)rs
r

r

= e(g ska +vkOT , g (ska +vkOT )s )e(hrs , h) = e(g ska +vkOT hrs , g (ska +vkOT )s h)e(g, g)
= e(g, g)e(h, γB ).

– Point 3. For i ∈ {1, · · · , d},
e(Cbi , Cbi g −1 ) = e(ghrbi , ghrbi g −1 ) = e(ghrbi , hrbi ) = e((ghrbi )rbi , h) = e(h, γbCi )
rb̄

e(Cb̄i , Cb̄i g −1 ) = e(h

i

,h

rb̄

i

rb̄

g −1 ) = e(g −1 h

i

,h

rb̄

i

rb̄

) = e((g −1 h

i

)

rb̄

i

, h) = e(h, γb̄C ).
i
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– Point 4. Verify the following equality Ebi = e(g, Dbi )e(h, γbDi ) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , d}.
rb

rb̄

e(g, Dbi )e(h, γbDi ) = e(g, vbi hsbi )e(h, g −sbi )e(h, vbi i vb̄ i )
i

=

rb̄
rb
e(g, vbi )e(h, vbi i )e(h, vb̄ i )
i

Y

= e(g, vbi )

e(hrj , vj ) = Ebi .

j∈{bi ,b̄i }

?

– Point 5. Verify the following equality E = e(A, g)e(h, γA ).
e(A, g)e(h, γA ) = e(va hr , g)e(h, g sbd −r

r

Y

vj j hsj rj )

j∈{bd ,b̄d }

= e(va hr , g)e(h, g

sb −r

r

sb −r

d

r

Y

)e(h,

vj j hsj rj )

j∈{bd ,b̄d }

= e(va h , g)e(h, g

d

r

Y

)

e(vj j hsj rj , h)

j∈{bd ,b̄d }
sb

= e(vbd h

d

sb

, g)e(vbd h

d

sb̄

, hrbd )e(vb̄d h
sb̄

= e(vbd hsbd , ghrbd )e(vb̄d h

d

,h

rb̄

d

d

,h

rb̄

d

)

) = E.

t
u

Perfect anonymity. Following [6, 11, 12], we will prove that our scheme is secure in the anonymity
game against adaptively chosen message attacks. Informally, the perfect anonymity comes from two in1

tuitive arguments. First, for skOT ∈R Z∗n , vkOT = g skOT , and for some message M , δOT = g skOT +M ,
meaning that vkOT and δOT are similarly generated, regardless which signing key is used. Second, all
the commitments are perfectly hiding and the proofs are perfectly zero-knowledge, when h has order n.
In addition, an adversary can tell whether h is a random generator of Gq or G with negligible probability
using a reduction proof based on the Subgroup Decision problem.

We assume there exist a simulator B that plays the Subgroup Decision problem with probability AdvB
and an adversary A that wants to break the anonymity of the above ring signature scheme. In the game
G0 , the simulator computes h as an element in G and in the game G1 , it computes h as an element in
Gq . We denote the adversary’s advantage in these games as AdvA and AdvA,G1 , respectively.
We consider a simulator B receiving the Subgroup Decision challenge λ = (n, G, GT , e, g, h). It then creates
the public parameters as in the real scheme, and sends the parameters to an adversary A and plays the
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anonymity game with it. If h ∈ G, then A plays the normal game G0 . If h ∈ Gq , then A plays the hybrid
game G1 . We assume that B is able to reply all the adaptively chosen message queries, i.e. it is able to
issue the signing keys for any user and to sign any message by any user, since it knows the challenge λ.
At some point, A chooses one message M and two identities i0 and i1 it wishes to be challenged on.
We assume that the adversary had not previously made a signing key query on ix . B creates a challenge
signature on M , and A guesses the identity of the signer. If A answers correctly, then the simulator
outputs b = 1, meaning that h is guessed to be in G. Otherwise, it outputs b = 0, meaning that h is
guessed to be in Gq .
We denote the simulator’s advantage as AdvB in the Subgroup Decision game. Since P r[h ∈ G] = P r[h ∈
Gq ] = 12 , we obtain that:
AdvA −AdvA,G1 = P r[b = 1|h ∈ G]−P r[b = 1|h ∈ Gq ] = 2P r[b = 1∧h ∈ G]−2P r[b = 1∧h ∈ Gq ] = 2AdvB ≤ 2ε.

The result comes from that AdvB must be smaller than ε due to the hardness of the assumption.

Next, in the real scheme, when h belongs to Gq instead of G, the challenge signature is statistically
independent of the signer’s identity in the adversary’s view: we will determine what the adversary may
deduce from δ.
First, we observe that vkOT , δOT , A, B, γB do not depend on the signer identity. However, since A is computationally unbounded, we assume that these values reveal some information relative to the exponents.
Second, we consider Cbi , Cb̄i , and the corresponding γbCi , γb̄C for each i ∈ {1, · · · , d}. There are two hypothei

ses that may be formulated by A: bi = 0 or bi = 1. For either hypothesis, there is a solution. Since h is a
generator of Gq , there are ηi,0 , ηi,1 ∈ Zq for each i ∈ {1, · · · , d}, such that Cbi =1 = ghηi,1 = hηi,0 = Cbi =0 .
Thus, we obtain that γbCi =0 = (ghηi,1 )ηi,1 = (hηi,0 )ηi,1 = (hηi,1 )ηi,0 = (g −1 hηi,0 )ηi,0 = γbCi =1 . This means
that the knowledge of Cbi , Cb̄i , γbCi , γb̄C for each i ∈ {1, · · · , d} does not reveal no information about the
i

bit bi , and therefore, it does not reveal the identity of the signer.
Finally, we focus on Dbi , Db̄i , γbDi for i ∈ {1, · · · , d}, and γA . These values are redundant in the adversary’s
view since the A already knows all the values that determine them.
Therefore, the identity is statistically independent of the entire signature δ, that means AdvA,G1 = 0.
Thus, we obtain that AdvA ≤ 2ε.

t
u
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Computational unforgeability. Following [6, 11, 12], our scheme is proved computationally unforgeable with relation to insider corruption. Informally, under the Subgroup Decision assumption, the probability that the forgery happens when we switch from h of order n in a common reference string to h of
order q is negligible. The commitments are now perfectly binding in Gp and the NIZK proofs are perfectly sound in Gp , and therefore some uncorrupted va ∈ S is contained in A and a signature δa on vkOT
under va is contained in B. We carefully develop this part in the proof below. Next, by the properties of
the one-time signature scheme, vkOT has not been used in any other signature and thus, δa is a forged
Boneh-Boyen signature on vkOT . We omit this part since the proof is quite straightforward: Boneh and
Boyen [2] showed that this probability is negligible under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.

We assume there exists a simulator B that plays the Subgroup Decision problem with probability AdvB
and an adversary A that wants to break the unforgeability of the above ring signature scheme. B receives
the Subgroup Decision challenge λ = (n = pq, G, GT , e, g, h), where (p, q, G, GT , e, g) ← BMGen(1k ) and
h is either equal to g r for r ∈ Zn or to g pr for r ∈ Zq . More precisely, in the game G0 , B computes
h as an element in G and in the game G1 , it computes h as an element in Gq . B runs A with input
the verification keys S = {v1 , · · · , vN } that B generates as in the real scheme. B also selects a user
ã ∈ {1, · · · , N } at random. If h ∈ G, then A plays the normal game G0 . Otherwise, if h ∈ Gq , then A
plays the hybrid game G1 .
B proceeds to simulate the oracle queries of A as follows.
– When A requests a signature on a message M , with respect to ring S (S might contain some
verification keys generated in an arbitrary manner by A), to be signed by user a 6= ã, then B can
easily generate the response to this query by running the Sign algorithm in a honest manner.
– When A requests a signature on message M , with respect to ring S (S might contain some verification
keys generated in an arbitrary manner by A), to be signed by user ã, then B cannot directly respond
to this query since it does not have the appropriate secret key for ã (we recall that vã = g skã for
some unknown skã ). Instead, B submits M to its signing oracle and obtains in return a signature for
ã. The remainder of the signature is calcultated as in the real scheme using h.
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– Any corruption query made by A for user a 6= ã can be accurately answered by B. However, if A ever
makes a corruption query for ã, then B simply aborts.
∗ , {C ∗ , C ∗ : i ∈ {1, · · · , d}}, {γ C∗ , γ C∗ :
At some point, A outputs a forgery δ ∗ = (vkOT , δOT , A∗ , B ∗ , γB
bi
bi
b̄
b̄
i

i ∈ {1, · · ·

, d}}, {Db∗i , Db̄∗
i

: i ∈ {1, · · ·

, d}}, {γbD∗
i

: i ∈ {1, · · ·

∗)
, d}}, γA

on a message

i

M∗

regarding some ring

of honest user verification keys S 0 ⊆ S. If vã ∈
/ S 0 , then B aborts. If Verify((n, G, GT , e, g, h, S), M, δ) →
“Accept”, then the adversary wins the game. We denote the adversary’s advantage in the games G0 and
G1 as AdvA and AdvA,G1 , respectively.
If h ∈ G as in the game G0 , then B provides a perfect simulation for the adversary A since the signature
given to B is as in the real game. Otherwise (i.e. h ∈ Gq as in the game G1 ), then the forgery is uniformly
distributed in Gq and independent of the random choices made by B. We recall that the simulator’s
advantage is AdvB ≤ ε1 in the Subgroup Decision game. Since P r[h ∈ G] = P r[h ∈ Gq ] = 21 , we obtain
the following.

AdvA − AdvA,G1 = P r[A wins the game G0 ] − P r[A wins the game G1 ]
= P r[Verify((n, G, GT , e, g, h, S), M, δ) → “Accept”|h ∈ G]
−P r[Verify((n, G, GT , e, g, h, S), M, δ) → “Accept”|h ∈ Gq ]
= 2P r[Verify((n, G, GT , e, g, h, S), M, δ) → “Accept“ ∧ h ∈ G]
−2P r[Verify((n, G, GT , e, g, h, S), M, δ) → ”Accept” ∧ h ∈ Gq ]
= 2AdvB ≤ 2ε1 .

Now in the game G1 , the commitments are perfectly binding in Gp and the NIZK proofs are perfectly
sound in Gp . We show these results for the commitments Cbi , the other commitments following a similar demonstration. We recall that Cbi = ghrbi , for i = 1, · · · , d. The corresponding NIZK proof for the
?

statement γbCi = (ghrbi )rbi is verified by checking e(Cbi , Cbi g −1 ) = e(h, γbCi ). (When h ∈ Gn and since γbCi
is uniquely determined from the verification equation, the proof has perfectly zero-knowledge.) When
h ∈ Gq , the verification shows that e(Cbi , Cbi g −1 ) has order q. Since this happens for all the commitments
and the corresponding NIZK proofs, there is a honest user a with uncorrupted signing public key vka ∈ S
such that A∗ = vka hr and so there is a signer’s certifying signature δa on vkOT such that B ∗ = δa hs .
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In other words, if A outputs a valid forgery, then with all but negligible probability ε2 by soundness of
NIZK, it holds that δ ∗ is a valid signature of M ∗ regarding va for some a. From this, with probability
1/N , we get that the event [B did not abort ∧ δ ∗ is a valid signature of M ∗ regarding vã for ã] occurs.
Therefore, the advantage of the adversary in the game G1 is

AdvA,G1 ≤ N · ε2 .

Afterwards, the forgery δ ∗ on M ∗ implies a forgery of the Boneh-Boyen signature. More precisely, A
contains a verification key that is not corrupted and B contains a signature on vkOT under this verification key. We recall that the probability of the event [vkOT has not been used in any other signature]
is negligible based on the properties of the one-time signature scheme and the Strong Diffie-Hellman
assumption. For simplicity, we do not count this part in our security analysis.
We conclude that the adversary succeeds with probability AdvA ≤ ε1 + N · ε2 .

4.3

t
u

Working in Prime Order Groups

We work in composite order groups in our construction. The anonymity relies on the hardness of the Subgroup
Decision assumption. This assumption is as follows: given a group G of composite order n = pq, it is hard to
decide whether a given element g ∈ G is in the subgroup of order p without knowing p and q. It has to be
infeasible to factor n to achieve this hardness. This results in very large parameter sizes, e.g. log2 n = 3072
or 3248 for a 128-bit security level, according to NIST or ECRYPT II recommendations [13].
Extending our scheme in prime order groups would be an interesting challenge to gain in efficiency.
In addition, the pairing computation seems to be much slower in the composite order setting than in the
prime order setting. We reckon that there are useful properties for bilinear composite order models to
design protocols, however the latters are not very competitive compared to the protocols relying on other
assumptions such that prime order models with asymetric pairings.
Recently, Groth et al. [12] have shown that their NIWI and NIZK techniques can be realized in prime
order groups under the Decision Linear problem. We could apply these results in our ring signature protocol
to obtain a scheme in prime order groups.
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5

Conclusion

In this paper, we contructed the first ring signature scheme of logarithmic size in the number of users in
the ring, improving the sub-linear size result obtained in [8]. Inspired by Chandran et al.’s work [8], our
scheme requires a common reference string and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and is proved
secure without relying on random oracles.
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